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I. INTRODUCTION
In a world of nation states, citizens rely on their states for protection.
The U.S. Foreign Affairs Manual proclaims: "The U.S. Department of
State and our embassies and consulates abroad have no greater
responsibility than the protection of U.S. citizens overseas."1  The
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations states that the core of consular
functions consists of protecting "the interests of the sending State and of
its nationals.",2  Yet, in today's world, millions of individuals lack state
protection. The stateless and refugees comprise two of the major groups
that, in the words of former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren,
lack "the right to have rights."
3
Stateless people cannot claim membership in any of the more than
190 states in the international system. No state views them as integral
members of the national community. As noncitizens, they cannot access
the levers of power; they cannot access the courts; they cannot access the
law. In a world of nation states, the stateless fall between the cracks.
The lack of state protection is the defining characteristic of statelessness.
"Remove [citizenship] and there remains a stateless person, disgraced
and degraded in the eyes of his countrymen. He has no lawful claim to
. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I thank Brooklyn Law School for its generous
support and Alexander Eleftherakis for excellent research assistance.
1. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 01 l(a) (2012).
2. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes art. 5(a), Apr.
24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
3. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, J., dissenting), overruled in part by
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). Earlier, Hannah Arendt had written: "We became aware of
the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by
one's actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when
millions of people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global
political situation .... Only with a completely organized humanity could the loss of home and
political status become identical with expulsion from humanity altogether." HANNAH ARENDT, THE
ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 294 (1951).
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protection from any nation, and no nation may assert rights on his
behalf."
4
The lack of state protection is also the hallmark of refugee status.
Although refugees generally are citizens of a state, frequently possess
passports, and often have a national identity, they cannot rely on their
own state to protect them. For refugees, these indicia of citizenship are
formalities. In a world of nation states, refugees are effectively on their
own. They are de facto stateless. As a consequence, they need other
states to step in and provide surrogate protection: refugee status.
Statelessness and refugee law both overlap and diverge. In this
Article, I will explore some of the intersections between statelessness
and refugee law. In particular, I will examine judicial opinions in
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States which review claims
of persecution submitted by stateless applicants for asylum.
To set the context, I will first provide a short overview of the treaty
frameworks concerning statelessness and refugee status. I will then
describe some of the major populations of stateless people in the world
and where they are located. Next I will note some of the principal
mechanisms that result in statelessness. Then I will turn to the
jurisprudence involving stateless individuals seeking protection as
refugees in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Four
recent cases present different aspects of the vulnerability of stateless
individuals. Some of the claims involve statelessness resulting from
government wartime decrees stripping groups of people of their
citizenship.5 Another involves succession of states, with statelessness a
consequence of naturalization laws that impose language requirements
on long-time inhabitants. Yet another involves statelessness from birth,
compounded by lack of proof of identity. In all four instances, the courts
are sympathetic to the claimants' contention that their experiences of
statelessness make them fear persecution. Yet, jurisprudential attention
to the intersection of statelessness and refugee law is in its early stages,
and the courts are cautious, remanding three of the cases for further
factual and legal development of the issue. Despite the incomplete
assessments of the refugee claims of these stateless individuals, the
4. Perez, 356 U.S. at 64 (Warren, J., dissenting).
5. 1 use the following terminology in this article: "Denationalization" refers to the withdrawal
of citizenship from people who currently possess it. "Denaturalization" is one type of
denationalization; it refers to the withdrawal of citizenship from people who acquired citizenship
through a government process called naturalization, as opposed to acquiring citizenship at birth. The
rejection of an application for citizenship is neither denationalization nor denaturalization; denial of
a new applicant for citizenship is different from withdrawal of citizenship from one already in
possession of it.
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tentative framework that emerges provides useful guideposts. It also
leaves many questions unanswered. In closing, I will identify several
contemporary situations that raise new and important inquiries about the
intersection of statelessness and refugee law.
II. THE TREATY FRAMEWORKS
Three international treaties form the framework for considering
refugees and stateless individuals. The first of these treaties, the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee
Convention),6 was forged in the ashes of World War II. Its central tenet:
refugees need protection from persecution. 7 One hundred forty-five
states have become parties8 and are bound by its command, "No
Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion."9  In
addition to the absolute prohibition against "refoulement," Contracting
States agree on the criteria that qualify individuals for refugee status:
[T]he term "refugee" shall apply to any person who.., owing to a
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing
to such fear 0is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country ....
This well-known refugee definition refers expressly both (1) to fears
of persecution and (2) to individuals who have a nationality. It does not
directly address statelessness or equate statelessness with persecution.
But the 1951 Refugee Convention acknowledges the existence of
statelessness and the persecution that stateless individuals may face. It
explicitly extends refugee protections to those lacking a nationality who
fear persecution on account of one of the five enumerated grounds. 1
6. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter
1951 Refugee Convention].
7. See id.
8. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION
(Mar. 30,2015,5:40 AM), https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsll.aspx?&src=TREATY&
mtdsgno=V-2&chapter-5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en.
9. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at art. 33(1).
10. Id. at art. I(A)(2) (emphasis added).
11. Id
20151
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These stateless individuals are eligible for refugee status so long as they
are "outside the country of [their] former habitual residence."12 Under
the 1951 Refugee Convention, the stateless-like those possessing
citizenship-must have crossed an international border to qualify for
refugee protection. Thus, from its inception, the 1951 Refugee
Convention foresaw that stateless individuals would sometimes face
serious threats of persecution on racial, religious, ethnic, political, and/or
social grounds, and on those occasions would qualify as refugees if they
had left the country where they lived.
When the 1951 Refugee Convention was drafted, in the wake of the
World War II, the general view was that refugees presented a more
urgent humanitarian challenge than stateless people and that statelessness
would decrease as decolonization proceeded and a new world order
emerged.1 3 Indeed, for decades the United Nations, an organization of
states, did not task any unit or agency to attend to the stateless.14 Finally,
in the 1990s, the United Nations formally acknowledged that the
stateless constitute a sizeable and vulnerable world-wide population, and
the United Nations General Assembly assigned the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) responsibility for the stateless. 15
The lack of United Nations' oversight of stateless populations did
not mean that international law was blind to statelessness. In fact,
shortly after the conclusion of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the
international community negotiated two separate treaties directly
addressing the phenomenon of statelessness. The 1954 Convention
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954 Statelessness
Convention) sets forth the basic definition of statelessness: "[T]he term
'stateless person' means a person who is not considered as a national by
any State under the operation of its law."'
16
Echoing the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1954 Statelessness
Convention requires State Parties to provide stateless persons with access
12. Id. (emphasis added).
13. JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 64-65 (2d ed.
2014).
14. In 1974, the United Nations General Assembly instructed UNHCR to assist stateless
peoples pursuant to the terms of the 1961 Convention. UNHCR, A SPECIAL REPORT: ENDING
STATELESSNESS WITHIN 10 YEARS 7, available at http://unhcr.org/statelesscampaign2014/Stateless-
Report eng final3.pdf [hereinafter ENDING STATELESSNESS]. However, UNHCR did not receive
operational responsibility to protect as well as prevent/reduce statelessness until 1996. See infra
note 15 and accompanying text.
15. G.A. Res. 50/152, 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/50/152 (Feb. 9, 1996); Stateless - UNHCR
Actions, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c l6a.html (last visited May 25, 2015).
16. Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 1 (1), adopted Sept. 28, 1954, 360
U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force June 6, 1960) [hereinafter 1954 Statelessness Convention].
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to courts, 17 to housing, 18 to elementary education, 19 to employment, 20 and
to many other aspects of public life. Nonetheless, the promise of this
treaty has largely been unfulfilled for two principal reasons. First,
relatively few states have acceded to the 1954 Statelessness Convention.
By 2010, only 65 (of 190) states had become parties; 21 in contrast, 144
states had ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention.22 In recent years, the
UNHCR campaign to encourage treaty ratifications has borne fruit and
82 states had become parties to the 1954 Statelessness Convention by
early 2015.23 Nonetheless, the number of Contracting Parties is still
relatively small.
Second, and more importantly, many of the rights enumerated in the
1954 Convention are limited to stateless individuals lawfully present
within the territory.24 In reality, many states with large populations of
stateless people insist that the stateless residents are unlawfully present. 25
Therefore, even if the state becomes a party to the treaty, the treaty
provisions frequently do not apply to its stateless inhabitants.
In the decade following the 1954 Statelessness Convention,
statelessness did not disappear on its own, and the international
community took renewed interest in the phenomenon. A more proactive
treaty approach was adopted, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness (1961 Convention), requiring State Parties to take action to
decrease the conditions that give rise to statelessness. 2' The 1961
Convention features two major avenues of statelessness reduction. State
Parties agree both to grant citizenship more generously and, at the same
17. Id. at art. 16.
18. 1d. at art. 21.
19. Id. at art. 22(l).
20. Id. at art. 17-19.
21. Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION (Mar. 30, 2015 5:00 AM), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsll.aspx?&src=TRE
ATY&mtdsgno=V-3&chapter-5&lang-en#6.
22. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 8.
23. Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 21; see also ENDING
STATELESSNESS, supra note 14, at 7.
24. See, e.g., 1954 Statelessness Convention, supra note 16, at art. 17(1) ("The Contracting
States shall accord to stateless persons lawfully staying in their territory treatment as favourable as
possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same
circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage-eaming employment.").
25. For example, the Myanmar authorities refer to many of the one million Rohingya residents
as illegal immigrants. See Todd Pitman, Myanmar Conflict Spurs Hatred for Asia's Outcasts, AP
THE BIG STORY (June 14, 2012, 5:54 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/myanmar-conflict-spurs-
hatred-asias-outcaSTs; see also ENDING STATELESSNESS, supra note 14, at 19.
26. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, adopted Aug. 30, 1961, G.A. Res. 896(X),
989 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1975) [hereinafter 1961 Convention].
2015]
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time, to reduce the circumstances in which loss of citizenship may
occur.27  First, states commit to providing citizenship to persons born
within their territory if they would otherwise be stateless.28 States have
the option to provide citizenship at birth to the otherwise stateless or to
establish an application process that stateless individuals can pursue
during their childhood or early adult years.29 Second, State Parties agree
to prevent the loss of citizenship if that would render the individual
stateless. 30  For example, states shall not deprive a person of nationality
if that would render him or her stateless. 3' States shall not allow
renunciation of nationality unless the person has or acquires another
nationality.32 States whose laws tie loss of nationality to marriage,
divorce, adoption, or other change in personal status shall make the loss
contingent on the acquisition of another nationality.33
27. See id
28. Id. at art. 1(1).
29. Id. at art. l(l)-(2). Article I of the 1961 Convention allows states to attach multiple
prerequisites to awarding nationality to individuals born in their territory:
1. A Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who
would otherwise be stateless. Such nationality shall be granted:
(a) at birth, by operation of law, or
(b) upon an application being lodged with the appropriate authority, by or on behalf
of the person concerned, in the manner prescribed by the national law. Subject to
the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article, no such application may be rejected.
A Contracting State which provides for the grant of its nationality in accordance
with sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph may also provide for the grant of its
nationality by operation of law at such age and subject to such conditions as may be
prescribed by the national law.
2. A Contracting State may make the grant of its nationality in accordance with sub-
paragraph (b) of paragraph I of this article subject to one or more of the following
conditions:
(a) that the application is lodged during a period, fixed by the Contracting State,
beginning not later than at the age of eighteen years and ending not earlier than at
the age of twenty-one years, so, however, that the person concerned shall be
allowed at least one year during which he may himself make the application without
having to obtain legal authorization to do so;
(b) that the person concerned has habitually resided in the territory of the
Contracting State for such period as may be fixed by that State, not exceeding five
years immediately preceding the lodging of the application nor ten years in all;
(c) that the person concerned has neither been convicted of an offence against
national security nor has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years or
more on a criminal charge;
(d) that the person concerned has always been stateless.
Id. at art. 1(1)-(2).
30. Id. at art. 5-8, 10.
31. Id. at art. 8.
32. Id. at art. 7.
33. Id. at art. 5.
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Relatively few states have ratified the 1961 Convention, although
there has been an increase from 37 to 63 parties in recent years.34 The
small number of State Parties to the 1961 Convention that commits states
to take concrete measures to reduce statelessness is particularly
troubling. Many of the new cases of statelessness in the twenty-first
century involve children born to stateless parents. 35 Adherence to the
1961 Convention-and according citizenship to children born in their
territory if the children would otherwise be stateless 36-would
effectively reduce the growth in statelessness. The failure to ratify this
treaty or to include the substance of its central provisions in national
legislation ensures that the problem of statelessness will continue to
fester in many places around the globe.
III. WHO ARE THE STATELESS AND WHERE DO THEY LIVE?
The treaties presuppose the existence of stateless people and sketch
out basic definitions and legal protections. They do not attempt to count
how many stateless people there are in the world today and where they
live. Stateless populations often are omitted from national registries,
creating insuperable challenges in gathering reliable data.37  The
UNHCR estimates that there are more than 10 million stateless
individuals, 38 and that they are found all around the globe: Asia, Africa,
Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas. 39 Roughly one-third of the
stateless individuals are children.4 °
Palestinians are the largest stateless population in the world. Recent
surveys count more than 11 million Palestinians, with 2.7 million in the
West Bank and East Jerusalem, 1.7 million in Gaza, 1.4 million inside
Israel, 2 million in Jordan, 525,000 in Syria, 450,000 in Lebanon, almost
200,000 in Saudi Arabia, and smaller groups in other countries all over
the world.41 Not all Palestinians are stateless, but many-perhaps half-
34. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION
(Feb. 14, 2015, 5:05 AM), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg
_no=V-4&chapter=5&lang-en; ENDING STATELESSNESS, supra note 14, at 7.
35. One-third of the stateless people in the world today are children. ENDING STATELESSNESS,
supra note 14, at 8.
36. 1961 Convention, supra note 26, at art. 1, 3.
37. ENDING STATELESSNESS, supra note 14, at 6.
38. UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS 2013: WAR'S HUMAN COST 2 (2014), http://www.unhcr.org/
5399a14f9.html [hereinafter WAR'S HUMAN COST].
39. ENDING STATELESSNESS, supra note 14, at 2.
40. Id. at 4.
41. Palestinians to Outnumber Jewish Population by 2020, Says PA Report, HAARETZ (Jan. 1,
2013, 5:59 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/palestinians-to-outnumber-jewish-popul
20151
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are. 42  Of those Palestinians who are stateless, the 1954 Statelessness
Convention excludes from its protections those who receive assistance
and protection from the United Nations Relief Works Administration
(UNRWA).43
Some of those without passports travel on Refugee Travel
Documents issued by the Middle Eastern countries that host large
Palestinian refugee camps. 44  Others possess a residence permit as a
foreign national.45 Still others have no official documents. The lack of
proof of citizenship impedes their ability to work, to change their
residence, to receive an education, and much more. These problems
have been exacerbated by the 2014 war in Gaza, which impelled many
Palestinians to flee.4 a The ongoing civil war in Syria, with massive
ation-by-2020-says-pa-report-l.491122; Where We Work, UNRWA, http://www.unrwa.org/where-
we-work (last visited May 25, 2015); Estimated Number Of Palestinians in the World by Country of
Residence, End Year 2010, PALESTINIAN CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, http://www.pcbs.gov.
ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/PalDis-POPUL-2010E.htm (last visited May 25, 2015); 11 Million
Palestinians Scattered Around World, JORDAN TIMES (Dec. 20, 2012, 10:54), http://jordantimes.
com/Il -million-palestinians-scattered-around-world.
42. See Abbas Shiblak, Stateless Palestinians, 26 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 8, 8-9 (2010).
But see Nina Larson, UN Aims to End Statelessness in 10 Years, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 4, 2014,
2:01 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-un-aims-to-eliminate-statelessness-within-10-years-
2014-11 (UNHCR does not record Palestinians as stateless due to the U.N. General Assembly's
recognition of Palestine as a non-member observer state).
43. 1954 Statelessness Convention, supra note 16, at art. 1(2)(i) ("This Convention shall not
apply [t]o persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other
than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance so long as they
are receiving such protection or assistance."). The 1951 Refugee Convention contains a similar
exclusion. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at art. I(D).
44. Of the 5 million Palestine refugees eligible for UNRWA services, approximately 1.5
million live in 58 official refugee camps located in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Gaza, and the West
Bank. Palestine Refugees, UNRWA, http://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees (last visited May 25,
2015). Many other Palestine refugees live in towns and cities near the camps. Id. The host
countries, such as Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, provide travel documents to refugees. See, e.g.,
Consular Services, Palestinian Travel Documents, CONSULATE GENERAL OF LEBANON,
http://www.lebanonconsulate-uae.com/en/home/services (last visited May 25, 2015) (providing
detailed information about obtaining and renewing travel documents for Palestinian refugees); see
also Rep. of the Comn'r Gen. of UNRWA for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 59-6 1, U.N.
Doc. A/62/13; GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 13 (2006); Oroub El-Abed, The Case of Palestinian
Refugees- Holders of Egyptian Travel Documents in Egypt and Jordan, ACADEMIA.EDU
https://www.academia.edu/205536/The-case ofPalestinian-refugees-
holders of the Egyptian traveldocumentsinEgyptandJordan (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
45. See, e.g., Ouda v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 324 F.3d 445, 447-48 (6th Cir.
2003) (stateless Palestinians born in Kuwait traveled on Egyptian travel documents); Faddoul v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 37 F.3d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 1994) (stateless Palestinian born in
Saudi Arabia traveled on Lebanese travel documents). See generally Palestine Refugees, UNRWA,
http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=86 (last visited May 25, 2015).
46. Renee Lewis, Palestinian Migrants Fleeing Gaza Strip Drown in Mediterranean Sea, AL
JAZEERA AMERICA (Sept. 14, 2014, 11:14 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/9/14/
[Vol. 63
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displacement both within and across Syria's borders, has also increased
the vulnerabilities of stateless Palestinians in the region.
47
Across the world to the east, Myanmar has more than one million
stateless people, many of them Rohingya Muslims who live on the
borders of Myanmar and Bangladesh, denied nationality by each state.48
The Rohingya are derided as illegal immigrants, though their families
have resided in the same villages for multiple generations. 49 They need
government permission to leave their villages or to marry or to have
more than two children. 50 Fleeing from communal violence, boatloads of
Rohingya have been turned back by coast guard units in Bangladesh and
elsewhere. 5' In the spring 2014 census, Myanmar officials refused to
allow the Rohingya to describe themselves as "Rohingya. ' '52  Instead
they registered them as "Bengali," implying that they had illegally
crossed the border from neighboring Bangladesh and had a homeland
that recognized them.
53
Statelessness is a major problem further north in Asia and in Europe.
The Soviet Union, which stretched through Europe and Asia for seventy
years, ceased to exist in 1991, leaving nearly 300 million people in need
of new sources of citizenship. 54  The fifteen post-Soviet states each
created their own citizenship laws, and hundreds of thousands of former
Soviet citizens fell between the cracks. 55 Two decades later, more than
600,000 remain stateless.56
gaza-migrants-boat.html.
47. See Analysis: Palestinian Refugees from Syria Feel Abandoned, IR1N NEWS (Aug. 29,
2012), http://www.irinnews.org/report/96202/analysis-palestinian-refugees-from-syria-feel-aband
oned.
48. Pitman, supra note 25.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. Malaysian and Indonesian authorities reported a large upsurge in boats containing
Rohingya refugees in May 2015. Thomas Fuller, Muslims Flee to Malaysia and Indonesia by the
Hundreds, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/world/asia/more-than-
1000-refugees-land-on-malaysian-resort-island.html. UNHCR, however, reported that more than
25,000 Rohingya and Bangladeshi boat people had fled during the first quarter of 2015. UNHCR
Regional Office for South-East Asia. Irregular Maritime Movements: Jan.-Mar. 2015, http://
www.unhcr.org/554c6a746.html (last visited Mar. 30. 2015).
52. Associated Press, Religious Tensions Cloud Myanmar Census, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/31/world/asia/religious-tensions-cloud-myanmar-census.ht
ml.
53. Id.
54. In Legal Limbo: Asylum-seekers and Statelessness, REFUGEES MAGAZINE, May 1, 1996,
available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b5587ce4.html [hereinafter In Legal Limbo].
55. Id.
56. ENDING STATELESSNESS, supra note 14, at 3.
2015]
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In the western hemisphere, the Dominican Republic is home to
another sizeable stateless population. In September 2013, the
Constitutional Court of the Dominican Republic ruled that children born
in the Dominican Republic to undocumented parents were children born
in transit.57 As such, the Constitutional Court concluded that they did not
acquire citizenship at birth.58 By making this ruling retroactive to 1929,
the Constitutional Court denationalized more than 200,000 individuals of
Haitian descent.59 They and their parents had lived and worked in the
Dominican Republic for generations; they had registered as Dominicans;
they speak Spanish, not Creole; many of them had never been to Haiti.6°
In a stroke, they became stateless. Subsequent legislation to authorize
citizenship is likely to benefit only a few, leaving hundreds of thousands
of vulnerable stateless individuals in the Dominican Republic at the
61beginning of the twenty-first century.
Stateless people live in every corner of the world. There are roughly
700,000 stateless people in C6te d'Ivoire.6z More than 250, 000 are
stateless in Latvia.63 Roughly 100,000 Nubians reside in Kenya, many of
57. Sentencia TC/0168/13, Constitutional Court of the Dominican Republic, Sept. 23, 2013,
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/526900cl4.html.
58. Id. The 2013 ruling by the Constitutional Court concluded that Ms. Juliana Dequis Pierre,
who had been born in the Dominican Republic to parents who had migrated from Haiti decades
earlier, was not a Dominican citizen even though Ms. Dequis Pierre had been officially registered at
birth as a Dominican citizen. Id.
59. Id. The Constitutional Court did more than deny citizenship to Ms. Dequis Pierre, herself
the mother of four Dominican-born children. According to the court, government officials had the
duty to identify similarly situated persons who had been registered as Dominican citizens since
1929. Id.
60. See generally Shaina Abner & Mary Small, Citizen or Subordinate: Permutations of
Belonging in the United States and Dominican Republic, I J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 76, 76-
79(2013).
61. The government of the Dominican Republic stated it would propose legislation to provide a
pathway for long-term residents to regularize their status and eventually to naturalize. Ezra Fieser,
Can Haiti and the Dominican Republic Repair Relations After Citizenship Ruling?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.comI/World/Americas/2014/0108/Can-Haiti-and-the-
Dominican-Republic-repair-relations-after-citizenship-ruling. In May 2014, the Congress of the
Dominican Republic enacted legislation granting citizenship to children born to foreign parents,
provided the children have Dominican government identification documents and are listed in the
civil registry. Randal C. Archibold, Dominican Republic Passes Law for Migrants' Children, N.Y,
TIMES (May 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/world/americas/dominican-republic-
passes-law-for-migrants-children.html. Commentators believe the great majority of stateless
individuals in the Dominican Republic will not benefit from the new law. 2015 UNHCR
Subregional Operations Profile - North America and the Caribbean, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr
.org/pages/49e4915b6.html (last visited May 25, 2015).
62. Who is Stateless and Where?, UNCHR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c15e.html
(last visited May 25, 2015).
63. Id.
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them stateless.64 While the international community has focused greater
attention on the phenomenon of statelessness in recent years, an accurate
estimate of statelessness is impossible. Many census figures do not
include them;65 they occupy the fringes of society; some of them are
nomadic. Like many stigmatized, vulnerable populations, they may
resist encounters with officials and remain silent about their legal
66status. 6 A rough estimate, including both stateless Palestinians and the
UNHCR estimates, which omit Palestinians from consideration,67 is that
15 million people are stateless in the world today.
68
IV. BECOMING STATELESS
In addition to a greater acknowledgement of the numerous and
widely dispersed stateless populations, there is a growing understanding
of the multiple trajectories that lead to statelessness. The succession of
states has been the primary cause of statelessness in contemporary
times.69 As noted above, the dissolution of the former Soviet Union in
1991 resulted in more than 300 million people who needed to obtain new
nationalities, a legacy of statelessness still haunting hundreds of
thousands of former Soviet citizens. Other examples of statelessness
triggered by state succession occurred when Czechoslovakia split apart
in 1993.71 Most of the inhabitants found citizenship in one of the
successor states, either the Czech Republic or Slovakia, but there were
many-mainly Roma-who acquired citizenship in neither.7
War is another major engine of statelessness. The Eritrea-Ethiopia
war that took place from 1998 to 2000, for example, led to major
denationalizations and deportations.73 Ethiopia expelled more than
64. Adam Hussein Adam, Kenyan Nubians: Standing Up to Statelessness, 32 FORCED
MIGRATION REV. 19, 19 (2009), available at http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR32/ 9-20.pdf.
65. ENDING STATELESSNESS, supra note 14, at 6-7.
66. Id. at 18-19.
67. Larson, supra note 42 (UNHCR does not record Palestinians as stateless due to the U.N.
General Assembly's recognition of Palestine as a non-member observer state).
68. See id. (stating UNHCR does not include Palestinians in its total); UNHCR, supra note 38,
at 5 (estimating there were 10 million stateless people in 2013); Larson, supra note 42 (estimating
4.5 million stateless Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza alone, and "millions more living around
the world").
69. See supra Part 11I.
70. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
71. See MARK CUTTS ET AL., THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 2000: FIFTY YEARS OF
HUMANITARIAN ACTION 189 (Mark Cutts ed., 2000), http://www.unhcr.org/4a4c754a9.html.
72. Id.
73. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE HORN OF AFRICA WAR: MASS EXPULSIONS AND THE
NATIONALITY ISSUE 4 (2003), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethioeritO I 03.pdf.
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75,000 individuals of Eritrean descent.7 4  Eritrea, though smaller in
population and territory, imprisoned 7,500 individuals of Ethiopian
origin and expelled thousands more.75 Many on both sides lost their
land, their property, and their citizenship.76
The war that engulfed the former Yugoslavia between 1992 and
1995 also led to massive dislocation, flight, and loss of citizenship.77
Montenegro, one of the former Yugoslav republics, for instance,
currently has more than 3,000 registered stateless individuals.78 In
current times, the Russian occupation of Crimea and of eastern Ukraine
has resulted in significant population shifts. Many Ukrainians residents
have moved eastward into Russia; others have moved west.79 Ukraine's
government no longer controls large portions of its territory, and
Russian-speakers in the east swear allegiance to the self-proclaimed
Donetsk People's Republic, a government not recognized by any other
state.8° It is exceedingly likely that this conflict will create more stateless
populations.
Jus sanguinis, one of the primary methods of acquisition of
citizenship, is an additional mechanism that can lead to statelessness. 81
Under thejus sanguinis principle, at birth children acquire the citizenship
of their parents.82 The children of stateless individuals, therefore,
automatically become stateless. Jus sanguinis can also contribute to
statelessness in other regards. For example, in jus sanguinis regimes,
children born to citizens who are living outside their homeland
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id. at 7.
76. Id. at 5.
77. UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 1997: A HUMANITARIAN AGENDA 7-8
(1997), http://www.unhcr.org/3eb7ba7d4.pdf.
78. Who is Stateless and Where?, supra note 62.
79. UNHCR Says Internal Displacement Affects Some 10,000 People in Ukraine, UNHCR
(May 20, 2014), http://www.unhcr.org/537b24536.htm].
80. Thomas Grove & Gabriela Baczynska, East Ukraine Separatists Hold Vote to Gain
Legitimacy, Promise Normalcy, REUTERS (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014
/10/30/us-ukraine-crisis-east-idUSKBNOIJ22G20141030. South Ossetia recognized the Donetsk
People's Republic in June 2014, but South Ossetia is another breakaway region in the former Soviet
sphere and itself is not recognized as a state by most other governments. South Ossetia Recognizes
Independence of Donetsk People's Republic, ITAR-TASS (June 27, 2014), http://itar-tass.com/
en/world/7381 10.
81. Elizabeth Grieco, Defining 'Foreign Born' and 'Foreigner' in International Migration
Statistics, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (July 1, 2002), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article
/defining-foreign-bom-and-foreigner-intemational-migration-statistics. The two major approaches
to transmission of citizenship at birth are known as jus sanguinis and jus soli. Id. Under jus
sanguinis principles, citizenship is based on the citizenship of the parents; underjus soli, citizenship
is based on the territory in which the birth occurs. Id.
82. Id.
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become-at birth-citizens of their parents' homeland.83 But sometimes
states require a period of physical residence in the homeland in order to
retain citizenship, or in order to pass citizenship on to the next
84generation. Expatriates who live abroad for long periods of time may,
as a result, become stateless.
Gender discrimination in the operation of citizenship laws also plays
a role in statelessness. Currently, there are twenty-nine states in which
women are not allowed to acquire, retain, or transmit their nationality on
terms equal to that of men.85 In some states, women lose their
citizenship at marriage and assume the citizenship of their husbands.
86
What happens if the husbands die, or divorce them? In states in which
women assume the citizenship of their husbands at marriage, a woman
who marries a stateless man is denationalized. 87  Her children, even if
born in the state of the mother's original citizenship, will be stateless at
birth.88 Multiple other scenarios can result in statelessness when gender
discrimination burdens the citizenship of women.
A major, though underappreciated, cause of statelessness is lack of
birth certificates.89 UNHCR reports that 70% of babies born to refugees
who have fled the Syrian civil war do not have birth certificates.
90
83. Id.
84. For example, consider the United States, which is well known as ajus soli country, but also
has legislation that includes jus sanguinis principles. Under the United States' jus sanguinis
provisions, children born outside of U.S. territory to parents who are U.S. citizens become U.S.
citizens at birth, but only if one of the parents resided in the U.S. prior to the birth of the child. 8
U.S.C. § 1401(c) (2012). If one parent is an U.S. citizen and the other is not, a child born outside of
U.S. territory acquires citizenship at birth only if the U.S. citizen parent was physically present in the
U.S. for at least five years or more, at least two years of which were after the parent was fourteen
years old. Id. at § 1401(g).
85. Women's Refugee Commission, Our Motherland, Our Country: Gender Discrimination and
Statelessness in the Middle East and North Africa 1 (2013), www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct-j&q=
&esrc=s&source=web&cd=l&ved=0CCAQFjAA&url=http3A2F2Fwww.womensrefugeecom
mission.org%2Fresources%2Frefugee-protection%2F942-our-motherland-our-country-gender-
discrimination-and-statelessness-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa- 1 %2Ffile&ei=7ujhVMTwG4
OiNpL3g7gH&usg=AFQjCNFYnfYkpV5JZt6KIPVBx
nH5w33T4Q&bvm=bv.85970519,d.eXY; see also Unequal Treatment of Women Risks Creating
Statelessness in At Least 25 Countries, UNHCR (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.unhcr.org/
4f58aee79.html; see generally UNHCR, Background Note on Gender Equality, Nationality Laws
and Statelessness (2014), http://www.unhcr.org/4f5886306.html; UNHCR, Gender Equality,
Nationality Laws, and Statelessness: Testimonials on the Impact on Women and their Families
(2012), http://www.unhcr.org/4f587d779.html.
86. WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMMISSION, supra note 85, at 11.
87. See id at 12 (discussing one woman's choice not to register her marriage because her
husband was stateless).
88. See id. at 1, 12 (explaining the relationship between a father's nationality and the
nationality a child will inherit).
89. ENDING STATELESSNESS, supra note 14, at 8-10.
90. Larson, supra note 42.
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Displaced people on the move may have nowhere to register.9' They
may want to wait until they return to their homes or until they settle in a
new location. By that time, it may be too late. The birth registry may
not be open to them. They may lack necessary witnesses or documents
92to prove citizenship. The children born during flight may be orphans
by the time they approach a birth registry office, with no proof of
parentage.
Even when parents are not in flight when their children are born,
they may face administrative or bureaucratic impediments to registering
births. The registry process may be accessible only at certain places and
hours or with certain types of proof. Or local norms may interfere. In
many communities it is not customary that parents register births. For
example, roughly 95% of Ethiopians lack birth certificates.93
V. COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE
In light of the myriad ways in which people become stateless and the
millions of people who exist without the protection of citizenship in any
state, the scant legal commentary on statelessness is surprising. Perhaps
due to the current UNHCR ten-year campaign to end statelessness, 94 it
has become a higher profile issue. One example of this is a renewed
attention to the intersection of statelessness and refugee law.
In the second decade of the twenty-first century, tribunals in Canada,
the United Kingdom, and the United States have examined applications
for asylum from stateless individuals.95 Central to these cases was the
claim that statelessness constituted persecution.96 In other words, the
applicants contended that the particular circumstances that gave rise to
their statelessness qualified them as refugees.97  Jurisprudence
concerning the intersection of statelessness and persecution has been
sparse in all three countries, and it remains so today. Nonetheless, it is
growing. The legal analyses proffered by the courts in the cases
discussed below have been tentative and incomplete. 98  They do,
however, all share a sympathy for legal orphans-stateless individuals
91. ENDING STATELESSNESS, supra note 14, at 8-10; In Legal Limbo, supra note 54.
92. ENDING STATELESSNESS, supra note 14, at 10.
93. S.T. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2011] UKUT 00252, [107] (appeal taken from
IAT) (IAC).
94. See ENDING STATELESSNESS, supra note 14, at 20.
95. See infra Part IV.A-C.
96. See infra Part IV.A-C.
97. See infra Part IV.A-C.
98. See infra Part IV.A-C.
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marooned in faraway lands who have no country to call their own-and a
willingness to look with a skeptical eye on arguments that citizenship
decisions are a matter of state sovereignty. 99
A. Choudry v. Canada
Choudry v. Canada confronted the Federal Court of Canada with a
bewildering and heartbreaking series of circumstances worthy of Charles
Dickens.100 Robin Choudry, a young Bengali-speaking man, applied for
asylum in Canada in early 2009.101 His parents had died when he was a
small child and he spent seven years in an orphanage in Pakistan.10 2 He
did not have a birth certificate and did not know his place of birth, but
thought he was born in 1982.103 Nor did he remember his parents or
know where they were born; the sole information he had about them was
a letter from the orphanage with his parents' names. 10 4 He believed that
his family belonged to the Bihari ethnic group that is centered in
northeastern India and extends into Bangladesh, Pakistan, and
elsewhere. 105
As a teenager, Choudry left the orphanage and set out for Canada in
the company of a man known as Johnny Kahn. 10 6 Instead, he ended up in
Greece, where he supported himself by working in a garment factory
until the factory owners fired all the illegal workers.' 0 7 Choudry then
worked as an unlicensed street vendor, and was regularly harassed by the
police.10 8 Fed up with his unstable situation, Choudry paid a smuggler to
secure passage to Canada, where he applied promptly for refugee
status.109
Without a birth certificate or information about his parents, Choudry
was effectively stateless. Moreover, even if his birth had been registered,
it might well show that he had been born to parents who were themselves
stateless. Hundreds of thousands of the Biharis, the group to which
Choudry believed he belonged, have lived as stateless people in camps in
99. See infra Part IV.A-C.
100. [20111 F.C. 1406 (Can.).
101. Id. at paras. 2, 5.
102. Id. at para. 3.
103. Id. at paras. 2, 7-8, 35.
104. Id.
105. Id. at para. 2.
106. Id. at para. 3.
107. Id.
108. Id. atpara. 4.
109. Id.
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Bangladesh for more than fifty years. 1o Many Biharis who lived in what
was then East Pakistan, had sided with the authorities in West Pakistan in
the 1971 war that resulted in the independence of Bangladesh."'
Despised as traitors by Bangladeshi officials, they were not accorded
citizenship in the new country,' 12 nor did the Pakistani government, more
than one thousand miles away, invite them to move west or extend
citizenship to them.' 13
The Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board assessed Choudry as
credible and believed his report of the things that had occurred to him.
114
Nonetheless, the Board was troubled by the lack of proof of Choudry's
identity." 5 The Board concluded, based on the historical circumstances,
the fact that his parents' names were Bengali, and the evidence that his
mother tongue was Bengali, that Choudry had likely been born to a
Bihari family in Bangladesh. 1 6  After examining the citizenship
legislation of Bangladesh, the Board further concluded that Choudry's
birth in Bangladesh did not qualify him for citizenship there. 17 As he
could not claim citizenship through his parents, whose citizenship status
was unknown, the Board ruled that Choudry was stateless." 18
In cases of statelessness, the 1951 Refugee Convention specifies that
the refugee applicant must be outside the country of his former habitual
residence and unable to return to it due to his fear of persecution." 9
Accordingly, the Board examined the mistreatment Choudry had
suffered in Greece, where he had most recently resided, and concluded
that it did not rise to the level of persecution.120  In response to
Choudry's claim that Greece might deport him to Bangladesh, the Board
reasoned (1) that it would be lawful for Greece to expel a non-citizen
such as Choudry, and (2) that if he were deported to Bangladesh
Choudry would likely face discrimination, rather than persecution, as a
110. ENDING STATELESSNESS, supra note 14, at 3.
111. Sumit Sen, Stateless Refugees and the Right to Return: The Bihari Refugees of South Asia-
Part 1, 11 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 625, 632 (1999).
112. ENDING STATELESSNESS, supra note 14, at 3. Since 2005, Bangladesh has accorded
citizenship to 300,000 stateless Urdu-speakers. Id. at 7.
113. Eric Paulsen, The Citizenship Status of the Urdu-Speakers/Biharis in Bangladesh, 25
REFUGEE SURV. Q. 54, 54-68 (2006).
114. Choudry v. Canada, [2011] F.C. 1406, para. 7 (Can.).
115. Id. atpara. 8.
116. Id. at paras. 8-9.
117. Id. at para. 9.
118. Id. at para. 8.
119. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at art. I (A)(2).
120. Choudry v. Canada, [2011] F.C. 1406, para. 12 (Can.).
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stateless person. As a result, the Board denied protection to
Choudry.1
22
On appeal, Choudry argued that the Board had failed to address the
central issue: did the Bangladeshi denial of citizenship to Biharis
constitute persecution on account of one of the 1951 Refugee Convention
grounds? 23  The Board had made multiple relevant findings-that
Greece would likely refuse to accept Choudry and try to deport him to
Bangladesh; that Choudry was a stateless Bihari born in Bangladesh; and
that stateless Biharis suffered widespread discrimination and lived in
poor conditions in Bangladesh.124 But it had not examined whether the
Bangladeshi authorities' denial of citizenship was itself a persecutory
act. 125
In response, the Canadian government acknowledged that the
Board's analysis had focused on Choudry's reception in Greece rather
than in Bangladesh, but noted that the Board had taken into account
Choudry's fear that Greece might send him to Bangladesh and had
discounted that as the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution. 26 The
government advanced two arguments to support the Board's ruling that
Choudry did not qualify for protection.127 First, it claimed that the Board
had incorrectly assessed the citizenship law of Bangladesh, and that
Choudry might be eligible for citizenship. 28 Second, it asserted that
statelessness itself does not constitute persecution and that Choudry had
not produced evidence of harm other than the "discrimination [of] a
denial of citizenship.'
29
Although the Federal Court agreed with Choudry that the
Immigration and Refugee Board's decision was fatally flawed, the Court
did not address directly the argument that denial of citizenship in
Choudry's circumstances constitutes persecution. 30  Rather the Court
criticized the Board's focus on Greece as Choudry's former habitual
residence and its failure to examine thoroughly the situation in
121. Id. atpara. 13.
122. Id. atpara. 15.
123. See idat para. 34.
124. Id. at para. 13.
125. Id.at paras. 36-37.
126. Id. at para. 39.
127. Id. at paras. 32, 36.
128. Id. at para. 36. According to UNHCR, Bangladesh has accorded citizenship to 300,000
stateless Urdu-speakers in Bangladesh since 2005. ENDING STATELESSNESS, supra note 14, at 7. It
is unknown whether this development would affect Mr. Choudry.
129. Choudry v. Canada, [2011] F.C. 1406, para. 32 (Can.).
130. Id. at para. 36.
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Bangladesh, where Choudry had also previously lived, and remanded the
case for reconsideration.131 Citing the Federal Court of Appeals decision
in Thabet v. Canada, the Court emphasized:
[When a stateless person] has been resident in more than one country it
is not necessary to prove that there was persecution at the hands of all
those countries. But it is necessary to demonstrate that one country was
guilty of persecution, and that the claimant is unable or unwilling to
return to any of the states where he or she formerly habitually
resided. 132
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the cursory attention the Board
paid to Bangladesh impermissibly undermined the Board's analysis:
Because the [Board] made the mistake of focusing upon Greece, a
proper assessment of the situation facing the Applicant in Bangladesh
was never done. It is not clear from its reasons that the [Board]
considered all the evidence before it on Bangladesh. Even if it did so,
the [Board's reasoning about statelessness in Bangladesh is] not
adequate to support the conclusion the Applicant does not face
persecution in Bangladesh because he is Bihari. In my view, the
Decision is both unreasonable and procedurally unfair. 133
Having identified the areas in which the Board's assessment of the
claim was flawed, the Court quashed the Board's decision and returned
the case for reconsideration by another panel of the Board. 134 Results of
the re-evaluation of Choudry's claim have not been published, and it is
possible that the statelessness aspects have been mooted under a fuller
examination of the citizenship law of Bangladesh.
The Choudry opinion, while offering an indication of circumstances
when a stateless person might require protection, does little beyond
suggesting that the Court was uncomfortable with the Board's reasoning
and result. The Court rejected the view that the denial of citizenship to a
stateless person can at most constitute discrimination, thereby falling
below the persecution threshold. 135  Yet it offered no insight into
fundamental questions in this case: does Bangladesh's refusal to
131. Id. at para. 39.
132. Id. at para. 28 (emphasis added) (quoting Thabet v. Canada, [1998] 4 F.C. 21, paras. 27-28
(Can.)). Canadian jurisprudence has devoted significant attention to determining which countries
qualify as a "former habitual residence" when assessing refugee claims filed by stateless individuals.
See Martchenko et al. v. Canada, [19951 104 F.R.T. 59, para. 6 (Can.); see also Maaroufv. Canada,
[1994] 1 F.C. 723, paras. 5-6 (T.D.).
133. Choudry v. Canada, [2011] F.C. 1406, para. 39 (Can.).
134. Id. at para. 40.
135. Id. at paras. 39-40.
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recognize long-term Bihari residents as citizens constitute persecution?
Would refusal to allow Choudry to return to Bangladesh constitute
persecution when Choudry has no country of nationality or other place of
lawful residence?
B. S.T. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department
In contrast to the Canadian inquiry in Choudry, the United Kingdom
adopted a more demanding approach when it examined the impact of
lack of citizenship in S. T v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department. 136 S.T., an Ethiopian citizen of Eritrean background, was a
lifelong resident of Ethiopia until he fled the country during its war with
Eritrea.1 37 He was born in Ethiopia in 1979 to Ethiopian citizens; his
mother was of Eritrean origin; his father was not.1 38 The applicant's
father died in 1992, but the family continued to live in Ethiopia until the
war broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 139 In 1998 the applicant's
mother, who ran a bar frequented by Eritreans and organized a savings
club for Eritreans, was arrested, detained, and ultimately deported to
Eritrea. 140 In 1999 the applicant was detained for a month in Ethiopia
where he was beaten and interrogated about his mother's activities in
support of Eritrea. 141 His Ethiopian identity card showing that he was a
dual national was taken from him.1 42 He was released from prison, but
one week later he was ordered to report to government authorities.1
43
After consulting his father's brother, an Ethiopian citizen living in
Ethiopia, he concluded he was in serious danger in Ethiopia and decided
to flee. 144 Several weeks later, in September 1999, he applied for asylum
in the United Kingdom.
45
136. [2011] UKUT 00252 (appeal taken from AIT) (IAC).
137. Id. at [8].
138. Id. at [4]. His father was Oromo. Id. The Oromo are the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia.
Ethiopia-Ethnic groups, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/
Africa/Ethiopia-ETHNIC-GROUPS.html (last visited May 25, 2015).
139. S.T. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2011] UKUT 00252, [6]-[7] (appeal taken
from AIT) (IAC).
140. Id. at [7].
141. Id. at [4], [7]-[9].
142. Id. at [10]-[11] (citing S.T. v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't, [2008] UKAIT 00032, [41]
(AIT)).
143. Id. at [8].
144. Id. at app. A, [3]-[4].
145. Id. at [9].
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The United Kingdom denied his asylum application in 2005, five
years after the Ethiopia-Eritrea war ended. 146 The immigration judge
found the applicant credible and ruled that he had been persecuted in
1999, but concluded that he was unlikely to face future persecution
because the war had ended five years earlier and the applicant's prior
persecution had concerned his mother's activities, not his own. 147 While
the case was on appeal, the applicant went to the Ethiopian embassy in
London to apply for a passport to allow him to return to Ethiopia.1 48 The
embassy refused to process his application on the grounds that he
provided insufficient proof of his Ethiopian citizenship. 49 He had fled
the country without a passport, no longer had an identity card, and lacked
a birth certificate-which 95% of Ethiopians do not possess.
150
The appeal was denied. 151 The judge agreed that the applicant had
provided insufficient proof of his nationality. 152 The judge presumed that
Ethiopia would recognize him as a citizen if he could gather evidence
that he truly was from Ethiopia.153 Once S.T. presented the requisite
evidence, the judge expected the Ethiopian embassy to issue a passport
and allow him to return to Ethiopia.
154
The applicant filed another appeal, and in subsequent proceedings
the applicant produced evidence that he had returned to the Ethiopian
embassy with further detailed information supporting his claim to
Ethiopian nationality, but that the embassy staff repeatedly refused to
process his citizenship application. 55  He also introduced extensive
expert opinion about the widespread denationalization of citizens in
Ethiopia during the war and the continuing problems that Ethiopians of
Eritrean background have in obtaining recognition as Ethiopian
citizens. 156 In light of the exhaustive information presented concerning
the conditions in Ethiopia both during the war and a decade later, the
tribunal in 2011 was more sympathetic than the earlier court that had
reviewed the asylum seeker's claim. The tribunal concluded that the
146. Id.
147. Id. at [12].
148. Id. at [11] (citing S.T. v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't, [2008] UKAIT 00032, [42]
(AIT)).
149. Id.
150. Id. at app. A, [47], [107].
151. Id. at [11].
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing S.T. v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't, [2008] UKAIT 00032, [41] (AIT)).
154. Id. (citing S.T. v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't, [2008] UKAIT 00032, [41]-[42] (AIT)).
155. Id. at app. A, [6], [11]-[14].
156. Id. at app. A, [45]-[46].
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applicant had taken all reasonable steps to furnish information supporting
his claim to citizenship and that the embassy had arbitrarily refused to
consider his application for a passport. 157 As a consequence, the tribunal
ruled that the embassy's actions in 2011 constituted persecution because
it effectively denied an Ethiopian citizen the ability to exercise his right
to return to his country. 1
58
In contrast to the Canadian case, the U.K. tribunal did not emphasize
statelessness that the applicant had experienced in the past. Instead it
directed attention to the current action of the government that, after
having driven its citizens abroad, now refused to acknowledge them or
allow them to come back home:
[1]t matters not whether a person who has been arbitrarily deprived of
their nationality is, as a result, regarded as stateless or as a person who,
in terms of international law, still possesses that nationality, albeit that
the rights associated with it cannot in practice be exercised. The
challenging issue is whether deprival of the right to return is per se
persecution. 159
Nonetheless, the U.K. court viewed S.T. as, in effect, stateless. This
is striking because the opinion noted in passing that in 1999 the applicant
had possessed an Ethiopian identity card categorizing him as a dual
national. 160  There was no discussion, however, of his other nationality,
how he acquired it, whether he could rely on it, or whether any other
country would recognize it. Describing S.T. as an individual born and
raised in Ethiopia by an Ethiopian father, the tribunal did not inquire into
whether he had had ever entered or lived in Eritrea nor did it suggest that
157. Id. at [104].
158. Id. at [90]. Although the tribunal concluded that Ethiopia refused to allow the applicant to
return, for purposes of providing guidance for future cases the tribunal hypothesized that long-time
residents of Ethiopia might be allowed to return as non-nationals in the future. Id. at [114].
Accordingly, the tribunal analyzed whether return to Ethiopia without citizenship would constitute
persecution. Id. at [119]. The tribunal concluded that non-citizens of Ethiopia would likely be able
to work and own property; but that their employment opportunities in Ethiopia would be limited-
they would not likely have access to health and education services, would be unable to vote, and
would live in an atmosphere of insecurity, particularly if they were viewed as Eritrean by family
background. Id. at [119]-[25]. In a case such as the applicant's, the tribunal ruled that such
circumstances would amount to persecution: "[T]he accumulated difficulties he would face, arising
from what ... is an arbitrary deprivation of citizenship/refusal to recognize citizenship, based on the
discriminatory grounds of the appellant's ethnicity, crosses the persecution threshold .... " Id. at
[127].
159. Id. at [87].
160. Id. at [11] (citing S.T. v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't, [2008] UKAIT 00032, [41]
(AIT)).
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he should seek protection from Eritrea or any other state. 16' Nor did the
tribunal refer to the 1951 Convention's caveat concerning multiple
nationalities:
In the case of a person who has more than one nationality... a person
shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his
nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he
has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of
which he is a national.1
62
Instead, the tribunal's opinion kept its focus on Ethiopia, both on its past
persecution of S.T. while he was in Ethiopia and its current mistreatment
of the applicant in the United Kingdom by refusing to process his
passport application or otherwise provide him with another means by
which he could return to Ethiopia-the only homeland he had ever
known.' 6 3 It was the Ethiopian government's refusal to accord him the
protection a state owes its nationals that constituted persecution. 64 The
government's action constituted persecution because it made the
applicant de facto stateless: alone in the world of nation states with no
state to protect him.
In comparing the Canadian and the United Kingdom cases, there are
several notable factual differences. S.T. had lived his entire life in
Ethiopia, 65 whereas Choudry had spent his childhood in Bangladesh,
followed by portions of his adolescence and young adulthood in Pakistan
and Greece.' 66  Furthermore, S.T.'s deprivation of citizenship had
occurred after his mother had been deported from Ethiopia due to her
Eritrean background and S.T. himself had been arrested, detained, and
deprived of his Ethiopian identity card.' 67 Choudry, in contrast, seemed
to have been born into statelessness, and there was no evidence that the
Bangladesh government even knew of his existence, much less directed
action at him with the intent of depriving him of citizenship.
68
Nonetheless, the S.T. and Choudry applications for protection raise
similar issues. The claimants in both cases argued that the state in which
161. ld.at[6],app.A,[1].
162. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at art. 1.
163. S.T. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2011] UKUT 00252, [60]-[127] (appeal taken
from A1T) (IAC).
164. Id. at [90]-[91], [125]-[27].
165. Id. at [8].
166. Choudry v. Canada, [2011] F.C. 1406, paras. 2-3 (Can.).
167. S.T. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2011 ] UKUT 00252, [7]-[8] (appeal taken from
AIT) (IAC).
168. Choudry v. Canada, [2011] F.C. 1406, paras. 2-4, 8-10 (Can.).
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they were born and raised had made them stateless. 169 They contended
that the state had an obligation to treat them as citizens and allow them to
return. 170  They asserted that the refusal to honor that obligation
constituted persecution. 171 The S.T. court agreed with this perspective,
and concluded that the historical evidence and the expert testimony
amply supported the applicant's claim.77 The Choudry court, facing
different facts, was more equivocal.173  It appeared sympathetic to the
applicant's perspective concerning statelessness as persecution, but it
remanded for further development of the relevant law and facts.1
74
C. Haile v. Holder
In 2010 and 2011 two U.S. federal appellate courts also had occasion
to address claims for asylum based on statelessness. Haile v. Holder, 75
like S.T., arose out of the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.176
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined the asylum
application of Temesgen Woldu Haile, who had been born in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia in 1976 to parents of Eritrean background. 77 Haile and
his parents were all citizens of Ethiopia, 78 at that time ruled by
Mengistu, the Soviet-backed military dictator. 179 When the Soviet Union
collapsed, Mengistu's government was overthrown, a new transitional
government was formed, and a referendum on the independence of
Eritrea from Ethiopia took place. The referendum voters were
overwhelmingly in favor of independence, and Eritrea became
independent in 199318o A year earlier, in 1992, Haile's parents had
169. Id. at para. 13.
170. Id. at paras. 21-23; S.T. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2011] UKUT 00252, [4]-
[II] (appeal taken from AIT) (IAC).
171. Choudry v. Canada, [2011] F.C. 1406, para. 34 (Can.); S.T. v. Sec'y of State for the Home
Dep't, [2011] UKUT 00252, [127] (appeal taken from AIT) (IAC).
172. S.T. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2011] UKUT 00252, [127] (appeal taken from
AIT) (IAC).
173. Choudry v. Canada, [2011] F.C. 1406, paras. 39-40 (Can.).
174. Id.
175. 591 F.3d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 2010). For my analysis of Haile v. Holder in the context of
U.S. asylum policy, see Maryellen Fullerton, The Intersection of Statelessness and Refugee
Protection in USAsylum Policy, 2 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 144 (2014).
176. Haile, 591 F.3d at 573.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Mengistu Haile Mariam, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Meng
istuHaileMariam.aspx (last visited May 25, 2015).
180. Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict, WASHINGTON POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/inatl/longterm/eritrea/overview.htm (last updated Mar. 1999).
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moved to Eritrea, leaving their teenage son in Ethiopia. 81  After
independence, the parents renounced their Ethiopian citizenship and
acquired Eritrean citizenship.
82
The son apparently remained in Ethiopia and was there in 1998 when
war broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia over the territorial boundary
between the two countries.1 83 The war brought mass deportations, with
each country deporting thousands of citizens and residents of the
"wrong" background. 84 For example, Ethiopia decided to identify and
expel residents of Eritrean origin who provided support to Eritrea.1
85
This led to the expulsion of more than 75,000 Ethiopian citizens of
Eritrean background, many in an arbitrary and vengeful manner with no
proof of disloyalty to Ethiopia.' 86 The war ended in 2000, but tensions
remained high between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 87  After the fighting
concluded, Ethiopia passed several laws allowing certain categories of
former citizens and residents who had suffered during the war to apply to
regain their property and their citizenship. 88 It is unclear whether these
laws have been effective.'
89
Haile, twenty-one or twenty-two years of age when war broke out
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, fled Ethiopia for Kenya. 90 Sometime later
he entered the United States, where he applied for asylum, alleging that
Ethiopia's removal of citizenship from ethnic Eritreans constituted
persecution.' 91  The immigration judge rejected his application after
reviewing a record that apparently contained no evidence that Haile had
been arrested, harassed or otherwise targeted for persecution before he
left Ethiopia.' 92 The immigration judge ruled that a country has the
sovereign right to define its citizenry, and that the removal of citizenship
does not constitute persecution per se. 193  The immigration judge
concluded that other than losing his citizenship Haile had not suffered
181. Haile, 591 F.3d at 573.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 73, at 5-6.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 18.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Haile v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 493, 495 (7th Cir. 2005).
191. Id. at 495-96.
192. Id. at 495.
193. Id. (citing Faddoul v. Immigration Naturalization Serv., 37 F.3d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1994);
De Souza v. Immigration Naturalization Serv., 999 F.2d 1156, 1159 (7th Cir. 1993)).
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harm in Ethiopia. 194 The immigration judge also concluded that, now
that the war had ended, Haile, a noncombatant, was not likely to suffer
future harm. 195 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. 196
When the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first
reviewed the BIA's decision in 2005, it agreed that Haile had not
submitted evidence that he had been personally harmed while still in
Ethiopia or that he would be likely to be targeted if he returned. 197 The
court remanded the case to the BIA, however, to examine more closely
the claim that Haile had been or would be deprived of his Ethiopian
citizenship:
[The immigration judge's] reasoning is problematic-it fails to
recognize the fundamental distinction between denying someone
citizenship and divesting someone of citizenship. ... [No] case of
which we are aware ... suggests that a government has the sovereign
right to strip citizenship from a class of persons based on their
ethnicity. It is arguable that such a program of denationalization and
deportation is in fact a particularly acute form of persecution.198
The court expressly declined to analyze "[w]hether denationalization as
such amounts to persecution" and further noted that the record was
insufficient to determine the current citizenship status of ethnic Eritreans
who had left Ethiopia during the war. 199  Accordingly, the court
remanded the case to the BIA for further factual findings and legal
consideration.0 0
The BIA rejected the asylum claim a second time.20 1 It reasoned that
denationalization does not always constitute persecution, and referred to
the nationalization changes that occur when borders are altered or states
like the Soviet Union dissolve.20 2  Further, the BIA concluded,
denationalization that occurs based on ethnic status or another ground
protected by the 1951 Refugee Convention does not, on its own,
constitute persecution.20 3 Rather, the BIA ruled, an asylum applicant
194. Id. at 494-95.
195. Id. at495.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 496.
199. Id. at 496-97.
200. Id. at 497.
201. Haile v. Holder, 591 F.3d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 2010).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 573-74.
2015]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
must produce some evidence of actual harm that he suffered as a result of
the loss of citizenship.2 °4
Haile filed another appeal with the Seventh Circuit, which again
disapproved of the BIA's approach to the case.2 °5 This time the court
emphasized the problem of statelessness:
[Although] a change of citizenship incident to a change in national
boundaries is not persecution per se, it does not follow that taking away
a person's citizenship because of his religion or ethnicity is not
persecution. If Ethiopia denationalized the petitioner because of his
Eritrean ethnicity, it did so because of hostility to Eritreans; and [this]
created a presumption that he has a well-founded fear of being
persecuted should he be returned to Ethiopia. Indeed, if to be made
stateless is persecution, as we believe, at least in the absence of any
[contrary explanation], then to be deported to the country that made
you stateless and continues to consider you stateless is to be subjected
to persecution even if the country will allow vou to remain and will not
bother you as long as you behave yourself 20 6
The court noted that the Ethiopian citizenship law followed the jus
sanguinis principle, conferring citizenship on children if at least one
parent is an Ethiopian citizen.20 7 The record, though, appeared to lack
information concerning the impact, under either Ethiopian or Eritrean
law, on a minor child of parental renunciation and/or acquisition of
citizenship.208 It also failed to include information about the applicability
to Haile of a 2003 law allowing Ethiopians to regain their nationality if
they had lost it by acquiring another nationality.20 9 As the court pointed
out, Haile had not renounced his Ethiopian citizenship in order to acquire
another nationality; the converse was true: Ethiopia had acted in a
manner that apparently rendered him stateless.210
The court further discounted the significance of the Ethiopian
government's agreement to provide Haile with a laissez passer document
to enter Ethiopia.211 Although the record indicated that the Ethiopian
embassy in the United States in some circumstances issues laissez passer
documents to individuals it presumes are Ethiopian citizens, it was not
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
207. Id. (citing ETHIOPIAN CONST. art. 6, § 1; Ethiopian Nationality Law of 1930, § 1).
208. Id. at 574-75.
209. Id. at 575 (citing Proclamation on Ethopian Nationality, No. 378/2003, § 22 (2003)).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 575-76.
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212clear if Ethiopia also issues laissez passer documents to noncitizens.
Moreover, the court was troubled at the record's silence concerning the
likelihood that Ethiopia would recognize Haile as a citizen if he entered
on a laissez passer.1 3 Once more, the court remanded the case to the
BIA for further analysis and proceedings.214
The Seventh Circuit's 2010 decision did not yield a definitive
conclusion regarding statelessness in the context of refugee law. It did,
however, provide general guidance on this topic. Under the Seventh
Circuit's reasoning, there is an important distinction between loss of
citizenship as a result of territorial changes and removing citizenship
from a group that continues to reside within settled boundaries.
215
Withdrawal of citizenship in the first scenario does not necessarily
constitute persecution, according to the court.21 6 Whether the deprivation
of citizenship in the absence of redrawn borders always leads to an
inference of persecution is unclear. But the court is emphatic that such a
deprivation of citizenship presumptively constitutes persecution if it is
based on ethnic or other Convention grounds.21 7 Moreover, without
specifying whether it is referring to all losses of citizenship or only those
occurring within undisputed boundaries, the court insists that withdrawal
of citizenship that results in statelessness is presumptively persecutory
even if the country allows the stateless individuals to remain and carry on
their daily lives. 218 To determine whether these lines of reasoning justify
the conclusion that Haile suffered persecution as a result of Ethiopia's
actions, the court remanded the case for further fact-finding.1 9
D. Stserba v. Holder
Shortly after the Seventh Circuit's Haile decision, the Sixth Circuit
considered Stserba v. Holder, involving a stateless claim that developed
in Estonia in the 1990s. 220 Lilia Stserba was born in Estonia during the
212. Id at 576.
213. Id. at 575-76.
214. Id. at 576.
215. Seeid. at574.
216. Id.
217. See id. (analogizing the Ethiopian treatment of Eritreans to "the Nazi treatment of the
Jews").
218. Id.
219. Id. at 576.
220. 646 F.3d 964, 968-69 (6th Cir. 2011). For my analysis of Stserba v. Holder in the context
of U.S. asylum policy, see Maryellen Fullerton, The Intersection of Statelessness and Refugee
Protection in USAsylum Policy, 2 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 144 (2014).
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Soviet era to an ethnic Russian family.22' She received medical training
in St. Petersburg, Russia, at the Leningrad Pediatric School and returned
to Estonia where she practiced medicine.222 She married a Russian
citizen and gave birth in Estonia to a son, Artjom. 223
Estonia, which had been occupied by the Soviet Union since World
War II, regained its independence in 1991.224 There was great hostility to
the Soviet era efforts that had diluted the Estonian population by
encouraging ethnic Russians to move to Estonia and help pacify the
area, 225 and the new Estonian nationality law restricted citizenship to
those whose families had possessed Estonian citizenship prior to the
Soviet occupation in 1940.226 Others, including lifelong residents, were
eligible for citizenship if they could speak Estonian and pass a language
test.
227
Lilia Sterbsa and Artjom were citizens of the Soviet Union, but when
the Soviet Union dissolved, they did not qualify for citizenship under the
new Estonian law, rendering them stateless.228 In 1993, however, Stserba
and her son Artjom became Estonian citizens, apparently as part of an
electoral change.229 Stserba's second son, Anton, who was born in 1992,
also gained Estonian citizenship in 1993, while it appeared that her
husband remained a Russian citizen.230 Stserba's troubles were not over,
however. She testified that five years later, in 1998, Estonia stopped
recognizing scientific degrees issued by Russian institutions, with
apparent retroactive effect because Stserba reported that this policy
change meant that she could no longer practice medicine in Estonian
hospitals. 231  In addition, Stserba testified that the Estonian medical
221. Stserba, 646 F.3d at 969.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 968-69 (discussing details of Sterbsa's life).
224. Estonia's History, ESTIONIA.EU, http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/history/estonias-history
.html (last visited May 25, 2015).
225. Id.; Stserba, 646 F.3d at 969. Ethnic Estonians constituted 88.1% of the population of
Estonia in 1934, by 1989, they constituted only 61.5%. Population by Nationality, ESTIONIA.EU,
http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/country/population-by-nationality.html (last visited May 25, 2015).
226. Lowell W. Barrington, The Making of Citizenship Policy in the Baltic States, 13 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 159, 177 (1999). See generally Richard C. Visek, Creating the Ethnic Electorate
through Legal Restorationism: Citizenship Rights in Estonia, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 315 (1997)
(discussing the history of Estonia's independence and its impact on citizenship).
227. Citizenship, ESTONIA, http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/society/citizenship.html (last updated
Mar. 4,2015).
228. Stserba, 646 F.3d at 969.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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treatment for her son Anton, who was born with a severe medical
condition, changed for the worse.z32
Lilia Stserba, her son Anton, and her husband came to the United
States in 2003, where Stserba applied for asylum based on the
persecution she had suffered on account of her Russian ethnicity. 233 The
persecution consisted of her statelessness between 1991 and 1993, her
inability to practice her profession after Estonia revoked its recognition
of Russian scientific degrees, the inferior medical care her son Anton
received, and mistreatment her son Artjom had suffered in Estonia after
the rest of the family had left for the United States.234
The immigration judge concluded that the adverse experiences that
Stserba had suffered did not constitute persecution; as a result, he denied
asylum.235 With regard to the statelessness claim, the record showed that
ethnic Russians living in Estonia without Estonian citizenship could
remain residents, obtain travel documents, and vote in local elections. 236
Noncitizens, however, could not vote in national elections, purchase
property, or join political parties.237 Those who could speak Estonian
could apply for Estonian citizenship, and roughly 65,000 ethnic Russians
were naturalized in Estonia during the 1990s. 2 38 The immigration judge
noted that Stserba had regained citizenship relatively quickly and had not
suffered "any adverse consequences" during the time she was stateless.23 9
With regard to the other claims of persecution, the immigration judge
concluded that Stserba's diminished professional opportunities did not
constitute persecution, nor did the medical treatment that her son
received. 40 The BIA affirmed.24'
The Sixth Circuit was more sympathetic to the argument that
statelessness constitutes persecution than the immigration judge and the
BIA:
Regardless of the practical ramifications that befall a denationalized
person, the inherent qualities of denationalization are troubling when a
232. Id. at 969-70.
233. Id. at 970.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 971.
236. Id. at 973-74.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 971.
240. Id.
241. Id. The BIA also specified that the events involving the son who remained in Estonia did
not constitute persecution.
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country denationalizes a person who is not a dual national, thereby
making him or her stateless. Statelessness is "a condition deplored in
the international community of democracies." The essence of
denationalization is "the total destruction of the individual's status in
organized society" because, "[i]n short, the expatriate has lost the right
to have rights." "While any one country may accord [a denationalized
person] some rights, . . . no country need do so because he is stateless."
"The calamity is 'not the loss of specific rights, then, but the loss of a
community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever."' The
United States Supreme Court has described denationalization as "a
form of punishment more primitive than torture." Accordingly,
because denationalization that results in statelessness is an extreme
sanction, denationalization may be per se persecution when it occurs on
account of a protected status such as ethnicity. Although the status of
"[s]tatelessness ... does not entitle an applicant to asylum," a person
who is made stateless due to his or her membership in a protected
group may have demonstrated persecution, even without proving that
he or she has suffered collateral damage from the act of
denationalization.
242
The Sixth Circuit summarized: "Although not every revocation of
citizenship is persecution, ethnically targeted denationalization of people
who do not have dual citizenship may be persecution. 243 Because the
immigration judge and the BIA had failed to analyze whether the
Estonian citizenship law constituted ethnic discrimination, the Sixth
Circuit remanded the case for consideration of this issue.244 The court
noted that there was reason to suspect that the law, though neutral in its
terms, impermissibly targeted ethnic Russian residents of Estonia.245 If
that was so, said the court, then Lilia Stserba may have suffered past
persecution when she became stateless, no matter the practical import, or
lack thereof, on her daily life.
246
The Sixth Circuit provided further guidance for the BIA's
reconsideration of the case. The court emphasized that if the BIA
concluded that Lilia Stserba had suffered past persecution, then U.S. law
would entitle her to a presumption that she will fear persecution in the
future.247 At that point the government could introduce evidence to rebut
242. Id. at 974 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958) (plurality opinion);
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 161 (1963); Makismova v. Holder, 361 F. App'x 690,
693 (6th Cir. 2010)) (citing Haile v. Holder, 591 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2010); Mengstu v. Holder,
560 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 2009)).
243. Id. at 973 (emphasis added).
244. Id. at 979.
245. Id. at 974-75.
246. Id. at 975.
247. Id. at 972 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2013)).
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the presumption by showing that circumstances had changed so
substantially that future persecution would be unlikely. 248 The court
noted that Stserba's reacquisition of citizenship in 1993 might suggest
that things have changed in such a way that she would not have a well-
founded fear of future persecution.249
The court cautioned the BIA, however, that the fact that Stserba was
no longer stateless would not necessarily end the analysis.250 If the BIA
concluded that two years of statelessness constituted past persecution,
thus triggering the rebuttable presumption of future persecution, then the
BIA must take an expansive look at the potential future harm Stserba
might face. 251 Even though Stserba may have no fear of future loss of
Estonian citizenship, the BIA must evaluate other forms of persecution
that Stserba could reasonably fear as an ethnic Russian in Estonia.252
In addition to remanding the case to the BIA for further development
of the factual and legal issues regarding Stserba's loss of citizenship
between 1991 and 1993, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the Estonian
invalidation of Russian medical degrees constituted persecution on ethnic
grounds.253 The record was unclear as to whether Estonia had withdrawn
recognition from all non-Estonian scientific degrees.254 Nonetheless, the
court concluded that the invalidation of medical degrees from Russian
institutions constituted persecution. 255 This imposed a heavier burden on
ethnic Russians, the court said, since they were the Estonian residents
most likely to have language skills that allowed them to seek training in
Russian schools. 256 Based on the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that Stserba
had suffered past persecution when her medical degree was invalidated,
the court directed the BIA to determine whether this qualified Stserba for
asylum.
257
In light of the alternative ground for asylum, no further analyses of
the statelessness claim have been published in the Stserba case. As a
result, the Sixth Circuit, like the Seventh Circuit in Haile, did not render
definitive conclusions regarding statelessness in the context of refugee
248. Id. at 975.
249. Id. at 976.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 977-78.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 978.
256. Id. at 977-78.
257. Id. at 978.
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law. Like the Haile court, though, the Stserba court provided some
general guidance on this topic.
The Sixth Circuit's approach to statelessness is succinct:
Statelessness is deplored by the international community, but
statelessness itself does not constitute persecution. 258 Government action
to withdraw citizenship is not necessarily unlawful, but withdrawal of
citizenship on ethnic or other protected grounds from people who lack
dual citizenship may constitute persecution per se.2 59  Further,
government action that renders persons stateless due to their membership
in a protected group constitutes persecution per se, which relieves
asylum applicants from the burden of producing evidence on the harm
statelessness caused them personally.
260
Though they examined asylum applicants who had experienced
statelessness in dramatically different circumstances, the Sixth and the
Seventh Circuit federal appellate courts offer strikingly similar
perspectives. Of course, both courts employ the unique U.S. framework
in which past persecution automatically gives rise to a presumption of
future persecution 26 ' a presumption not embraced by international
refugee law.262 Both courts emphasize that governments that deprive
citizens of nationality based on grounds protected by the 1951 Refugee
263Convention engage in persecution. Both courts signal that depriving
citizens of their nationality in situations that render them stateless is
presumptively persecutory.264 Further, both courts suggest that when the
two factors are present-(1) denationalization done on ethnic grounds (2)
resulting in statelessness-this may constitute persecution per se,
obviating the need for applicants to show they have suffered individual
harm due to statelessness.265
The courts' analyses diverge, though, in a fundamental respect.
Haile acknowledges an apparently more benign situation when loss of
citizenship follows from territorial changes rather than from
258. See id. at 973-76.
259. See id. at 974.
260. See id.
261. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text (discussing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)
(2013)).
262. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 13, at 251. Under international refugee law the
focus is on whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution in the future, and States that
allow former citizens to return and live ordinary lives are unlikely to be viewed as future
persecutors. Id.
263. Stserba, 646 F.3d at 974; Haile v. Holder, 591 F.3d 574, 574 (7th Cir. 2010).
264. See Stserba, 646 F.3d at 974; Haile, 591 F.3d at 574.
265. See Stserba, 646 F.3d at 974; Haile, 591 F.3d at 574.
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denationalization.266 Stserba, though conceding that statelessness does
not always constitute persecution, appears to equate all loss of
citizenship with denationalization. 267 Unfortunately, denationalization is
not the appropriate lens through which to analyze Lilia Stserba's claim.
Both Haile and S.T involved denationalization and more: wartime
governments issuing decrees withdrawing citizenship and deporting
individuals newly shorn of their citizen status.268 Years after these
hostile acts took place, the state continued to refuse to provide passports
to allow the former citizens to return, which triggered the requests for
269refugee status. Stserba, in contrast, involves the dissolution of the
Soviet Union and the attendant problem of successor states.27° In the
words of the Seventh Circuit, Stserba's "change of citizenship [was]
incident to a change in national boundaries., 271 Statelessness did not
result from government withdrawal of status, but from a vacuum-from
legislation enacted by a successor state that did not extend citizenship to
all longtime inhabitants. Moreover, the state later granted citizenship
and did not interfere with Stserba's efforts to obtain a passport. 272
Although the Sixth Circuit was wrong about the cause of Stserba's
statelessness, this does not mean that its conclusion that she may have
suffered persecution was necessarily incorrect. When territorial changes
impel states to enact new citizenship laws, it is possible that the new
citizenship legislation is drafted in order to render stateless an ethnic or
religious group.273 Is that what happened in the Stserba case? The terms
of the Estonian citizenship law did not extend nationality to long-time
resident Stserba.274  To remedy her statelessness, she faced a
naturalization process that included a language requirement.275 While
naturalization provided an avenue to citizenship, its language
266. See Haile, 591 F.3d at 573.
267. See Siserba, 646 F.3d at 974.
268. Haile, 591 F.3d at 573; S.T. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2011] UKUT 00252,
[7] (appeal taken from.IAT) (IAC).
269. Haile, 591 F.3d at 573, 576; ST. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2011] UKUT
00252, [11] (appeal taken from.IAT) (IAC).
270. See Stserba, 646 F.3d at 969.
271. Haile, 591 F.3d at 574.
272. Stserba, 646 F.3d at 976.
273. See id. at 974-75 ("By limiting citizenship to pre-1940 citizens and their descendants,
Estonia manipulated its citizenship rules to exclude ethnic Russians who immigrated during the
Soviet occupation.").
274. Id. at 974-75.
275. Id. at 975.
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requirement was burdensome for inhabitants like Stserba who did not
speak Estonian.
276
The pertinent question, which the Sixth Circuit did not address, is
whether the imposition of the language requirement constituted
persecution.277  Fluency in the national language is a standardprerequisite for naturalization,278 and is often justified as a means of
increasing communication among members of the society and
heightening a sense of national unity.279 Thus, whether or not one agrees
with the wisdom of including a language requirement for naturalization,
it is hard to conclude that the imposition of one-without more-
constitutes persecution.
Yet, further consideration of this aspect of Stserba's claim may be
warranted. Perhaps Stserba might protest the need for her to undergo the
naturalization process at all. Naturalization traditionally affords
individuals the opportunity to become members of a state to which they
have immigrated. But Stserba and her fellow ethnic Russians were not
immigrants. They had always lived in Estonia, and after decades their
homeland required them to naturalize in order to maintain the status
28quo. 280 In order to retain membership in the society in which they had
been born and lived their whole lives, they were forced to learn a new
language and otherwise satisfy the prerequisites for naturalization.
281
From this perspective, Stserba might argue that imposing any
naturalization process, with or without a language requirement, on
longtime residents constitutes persecution, particularly if it is likely to
276. Id.
277. The opinion did not refer to evidence that the Estonian citizenship legislation was animated
by the desire to render stateless ethnic Russian inhabitants. Evidence on this point would be highly
relevant in evaluating the occurrence of persecution on account of grounds prohibited by the 1951
Refugee Convention.
278. E.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, § 312(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a)
(2012)) (U.S. naturalization law requires applicants to demonstrate "an understanding of the English
language, including an ability to read, write, and speak words in ordinary usage in the English
language"). Similar language prerequisites exist in the naturalization law of France, Germany, and
many other states. CODE CIVIL [C. CIv.] art. 21-24 (Fr.); STAATSANGEHORIGKEITSGESETZ [STAG]
[Nationality Act], July 22, 1913, RGBL. I at 583, last amended by Zweites Gesetz zur Anderung des
Staatsangehdrigkeitsgesetzes [Second Act Amending the Nationality Act], Nov. 13, 2014, BGBL. I
at 1714, § 10, no. 1(6) (Ger.).
279. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA, &
MARYELLEN FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 119-22 (7th ed.
2012) (discussing U.S. naturalization requirements); Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying U.S.
Naturalization Policies, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 237, 267-68 (1994).
280. Stserba, 646 F.3d at 968-69, 975.
281. Id.
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result in statelessness for those who do not or cannot undergo
naturalization.
This line of reasoning was not developed in the Stserba opinion. It is
likely, however, to run head-on into traditional international law
principles that allow states wide leeway in determining their citizenship
laws.282 Though states' rights to define their nationality laws may not be
absolute, 3  the longstanding sovereignty interests in prescribing
prerequisites for naturalization, coupled with the evidence that the
Estonian naturalization process was in reality an effective avenue for
thousands,284 make it unlikely that the naturalization process itself would
be seen as persecutory.
Nonetheless, it would be important to inquire whether the citizenship
laws, including the naturalization requirements, are animated by hostility
toward an ethnic minority. Under the views expressed in Haile and
Stserba, legislation enacted with the purpose of targeting ethnic Russians
is presumptively persecutory.285 Further, Haile and Stserba both indicate
that citizenship legislation designed to render certain ethnic populations
stateless would constitute persecution per se. 286  Therefore, evidence
concerning the intent behind the citizenship laws would be relevant in
evaluating whether the statelessness that Stserba experienced constituted
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, social group, or
political opinion, the grounds prohibited by the 1951 Refugee
Convention.
The record in Stserba did not appear to contain direct evidence on
the purpose of the Estonian citizenship legislation, and the judges, as is
often the case in the refugee context, relied on indirect evidence. 287 The
Sixth Circuit indicated that neutral legislation containing a language
requirement constituted persecution because it had a disparate impact on
ethnic Russians. 88 This conclusion, in the absence of other relevant
evidence, is unwarranted. Language requirements generally impose a
heavier burden on some social groups than others. For this reason,
language requirements may be bad social policy. But, in light of the long
282. See SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (2d ed. 2012) ("Each state
has the right to determine how a person may acquire its nationality.").
283. See Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Preliminary Objection, [1955] I.C.J. 4, 6
(Guat.).
284. See Stserba, 646 F.3d at 973; Citizenship, supra note 227.
285. See Stserba, 646 F.3d at 974; Haile v. Holder, 591 F.3d 574, 574 (7th Cir. 2010).
286. See Stserba, 646 F.3d at 974; Haile, 591 F.3d at 574.
287. See Stserba, 646 F.3d at 974-75.
288. See id.
2015]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
tradition and frequency of language requirements in naturalization
proceedings, 289 their differential impact on groups in society does not
render them persecutory per se.
In addition to raising the significance of language requirements, the
Stserba case provides food for thought concerning the level of injury that
amounts to persecution. This was a major concern in the Choudry
decision as well, although the context was different. The Stserba and
Haile opinions discussed the possibility that statelessness might qualify
as persecution per se, obviating the need for applicants to show how
statelessness caused them harm personally.290 The Choudry court, in
contrast, remanded the case for further development on two issues:
whether Choudry would be stateless under the citizenship laws of
Bangladesh, and, if so, whether Choudry's stateless status in Bangladesh
would give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution.29' Suppose that
the record developed on remand in Choudry presented circumstances
similar to those in Stserba: stateless individuals have the right to reside,
obtain travel documents, and vote in local elections, but do not have the
right to vote in national elections, purchase property, or join political
parties. Those who can speak the national language can apply for
citizenship, and many thousands have done so.292 Would statelessness in
these circumstances constitute persecution? Such a society would
certainly not provide full membership to the stateless. Nonetheless, the
provision of residence rights, authorization to work, and the ability to
obtain travel documents would afford basic protection that is inconsistent
with persecution.293
The statelessness issues discussed in the Stserba case provide great
contrast to those examined in S. T. and Haile. In wartime Ethiopia, the
government took affirmative and hostile action against a group of
lifelong citizens.294 The state had not dissolved; the borders had not
changed; the citizens had not moved from their homes. The withdrawal
289. See supra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
290. See Stserba, 646 F.3d at 974; Haile, 591 F.3d at 574.
291. Choudry v. Canada, [20111 F.C. 1406, paras. 39-40 (Can.).
292. See Stserba, 646 F.3d at 973-74 (noting the number of people to go through the Estonian
naturalization).
293. See, e.g., HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 13, at 193-287 (providing a framework with
which to identify the harm that constitutes persecution). The experience of past denationalization
would not automatically lead to the conclusion that serious harm should be feared in the future. Id.
at 252. In this respect, Lilia Stserba's statelessness between 1991 and 1993, which had not recurred
for 20 years, would be an unwarranted predicate for refugee status. Under U.S. law, however, if the
statelessness Stserba experienced were persecution per se, it would give rise to a presumption that
she had a well-founded fear of future persecution.
294. Haile, 591 F.3d at 573, 575; see supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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of Ethiopian citizenship likely rendered many stateless.295 Moreover, it
was accompanied by confiscation of property, the risk of detention, and
massive deportations.296 The government provided no naturalization or
other process through which longtime residents could reclaim or gain
Ethiopian citizenship.297 Furthermore, after the war subsided and
legislation restored some property and citizenship rights, the Ethiopian
government continued to deny passports to former citizens it had
298rendered stateless. In these hostile circumstances the lack of
protection accorded to former citizens supported the conclusion that the
applicants had a well-founded fear of persecution in Ethiopia.299
VI. QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
These judicial opinions, in the longstanding common law tradition,
examined the statelessness experienced by four individual asylum
applicants. The courts did not consider the countless other circumstances
in which statelessness might qualify as persecution, leaving a multitude
of issues yet to be addressed at the intersection of statelessness and
refugee law. Nonetheless, common concerns resonate within these
decisions and they posit several legal presumptions. Most notably, they
all resoundingly reject the international law maxim that citizenship law is
solely a matter for the sovereign. 30 Indeed, states that remove
citizenship from current citizens-states that issue denationalization
decrees or enact denationalization laws-are suspected of acting
illegitimately. 30 1 When denationalization is linked to religious or ethnic
or other Convention ground, it is presumptively persecutory.0 2 When
such discriminatory denationalization results in statelessness it amounts
to persecution per se.3°3
In contrast, the cases suggest that loss of citizenship as a
consequence of the dissolution of states is not presumptively
persecutory. °4 Denial of citizenship to those who do not possess it is
295. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
297. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 73.
298. Id.
299. See Haile, 591 F.3d at 574.
300. But see MURPHY, supra note 282, at 72 ("Each state has the right to determine how a
person may acquire its nationality.").
301. See Stserba v. Holder, 646 F.3d 964, 974-75 (6th Cir. 2011).
302. See Stserba, 646 F.3d at 974; Haile, 591 F.3d at 574.
303. See Stserba, 646 F.3d at 974; Haile, 591 F.3d at 574.
304. E.g., Haile, 591 F.3d at 573.
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less problematic than withdrawal of existing citizenship. This does not
give states carte blanche to deny citizenship to vulnerable minority group
inhabitants. New citizenship legislation that provides no avenue through
which longtime residents can acquire citizenship will heighten concern.
Naturalization requirements that lack legitimate rationales will trigger
suspicion. When lack of citizenship makes residence and work
authorization insecure and daily life a hardship, it will raise warning
flags that well-founded fears of persecution may exist.
Turning these insights onto the broader world stage, the Haile and
Stserba presumptions of persecution when statelessness results from
citizenship laws that burden ethnic minorities305 may seem justified, but
they raise many perplexing questions. For example, in the context of
independence from a colonial power, is it unlawful for citizenship laws
to disfavor the colonizers and their descendants? In response to
government policies that have intentionally aimed to change the ethnic
composition of a restive area (consider Tibet under Chinese rule), would
it be unlawful for new citizenship laws to disfavor those groups that
arrived as part of the former government's pacification plan? Is
differential treatment acceptable so long as there is a realistic path to
naturalization for those long-term residents who would otherwise be
stateless? Do language tests, generally viewed as a legitimate
requirement for naturalization, become unlawful when applied to lifelong
residents? Is it relevant whether large numbers of the minority
population have successfully coped with the language requirement?
In addition, the suggestion of dual nationality that lurked in the
background of several of the cases evokes the need for further nuanced
analyses of this dimension. Should a 16 year-old who never left the
country of his birth and citizenship be deprived of his nationality because
his parents departed and renounced their citizenship? Is it lawful to
deprive an individual of citizenship and refuse him the right to return
based on claims that he is a national of a state that he has never
visited?306 Does it matter if he cannot speak the language of the second
country or has no economic prospects there? What if the government
removes the nationality of an individual who is not currently a dual
national, but has the ability to acquire citizenship in another state through
a parent (perhaps S.T. and Haile) or through a spouse (perhaps Stserba)?
These questions have not been explored and do not yet have answers.
305. See Stserba, 646 F.3d at 974; Haile, 591 F.3d at 574.
306. See generally Jon Bauer, Multiple Nationality and Refugees, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
905 (2014) (providing a thorough discussion of issues of multiple nationality and eligibility for
refugee status under international and U.S. law).
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Implicit in all four of these judicial opinions is that assumption that
states have responsibilities to their long-term residents.3 °7 The S. T
tribunal was particularly exasperated at the obstacles placed in the way
of former residents returning to their homeland and deemed Ethiopia's
refusal to grant a passport an instance of current persecution. This ruling
may have great significance as many stateless people have been forced to
move by the Arab Spring, the war in Gaza, and the ongoing Syrian civil
war. Many are stranded where conflict has pushed them. Others are
stranded when their jobs evaporate and their residence permits as
temporary workers expire. Would it constitute persecution if their
country of habitual residence refused to renew their travel documents to
allow them to return home after conflict or employment took them
abroad? 308  Would it matter how many years they had relied on those
travel documents? Are there other circumstances in which the refusal to
accept the return of a stateless longtime former resident constitutes
persecution?
Turning from the country of habitual residence to the country where
stateless individuals have been employed, are there circumstances in
which expulsion could constitute persecution? National law generally
requires noncitizens to leave when their residence permission expires,
but is this always true? Does it matter if they are stateless and have lived
their whole lives there? If they have done nothing to trigger the
expiration of their residence permit? If no other state will grant them
lawful admission?
These questions beget practical concerns. If expelled for no longer
having a work/residence permit, where does a stateless person go? If a
state cannot remove a stateless person, does living under the perpetual
threat of deportation constitute persecution?
307. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 13, at 250-51 (discussing the right of stateless
individuals to reenter their country of long-term residence).
308. Under U.S. law, the refusal of the country of last habitual residence to readmit stateless
Palestinians can constitute persecution. See Legal Opinion Palestinian Asylum Applicants, Genco
Op. No. 95-14, 1995 WL 1796321 (Oct. 27, 1995) ("[The] expulsion of or denial of reentry to a
stateless Palestinian ... by his country of last habitual residence may result in such serious violations
of the applicant's basic human rights as to constitute persecution. Whether such an asylum applicant
can establish that he has been persecuted will depend on the particular circumstances of each case.
If he does establish [persecution] because of his national origin as a Palestinian, or because of
another protected ground, he may qualify as a refugee under United States law."). But see M.A.
(Palestinian Territories) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 304, [21], [2009]
INLR 163 (Eng.) (state denial of entry to stateless person, "who, unlike a citizen, has no right of
entry into the country" is not persecution (quoting A.K. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2006]
EWCA (Civ) 1117, [47], [2007] INLR 195 (Eng.))).
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The answers are not simple or obvious. The crossroads of
statelessness and international refugee law is uncharted and urgently in
need of exploration. A comprehensive legal framework has not yet
emerged to ensure that refugee law fully addresses the plight of stateless
individuals who fear persecution, and we must continue to work to afford
protection to human beings who live in the shadows cast by statelessness.
